On Data-driven Curation, Learning, and Analysis for Inferring Evolving Internet-of-Things (IoT) Botnets in the Wild

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Abstract

The insecurity of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm continues to wreak havoc in consumer and critical infrastructures. The highly heterogeneous nature of IoT devices and their widespread deployments has led to the rise of several key security and measurement-based challenges, significantly crippling the process of collecting, analyzing and correlating IoT-centric data. To this end, this paper explores macroscopic, passive empirical data to shed light on this evolving threat phenomena. The proposed work aims to classify and infer Internet-scale compromised IoT devices by solely observing one-way network traffic, while also uncovering, reporting and thoroughly analyzing “in the wild” IoT botnets. To prepare a relevant dataset, a novel probabilistic model is developed to cleanse unrelated traffic by removing noise samples (i.e., misconfigured network traffic). Subsequently, several shallow and deep learning models are evaluated in an effort to train an effective multi-window convolutional neural network. By leveraging active and passing measurements when generating the training dataset, the neural network aims to accurately identify compromised IoT devices. Consequently, to infer orchestrated and unsolicited activities that have been generated by well-coordinated IoT botnets, hierarchical agglomerative clustering is employed by scrutinizing a set of innovative and efficient network feature sets. Analyzing 3.6 TB of recently captured darknet traffic revealed a momentous 440,000 compromised IoT devices and generated evidence-based artifacts related to 350 IoT botnets. Moreover, by conducting thorough analysis of such inferred campaigns, we reveal their scanning behaviors, packet inter-arrival times, employed rates and geo-distributions. Although several campaigns exhibit significant differences in these aspects, some are more distinguishable; by being limited to specific geo-locations or by executing scans on random ports besides their core targets. While many of the inferred botnets belong to previously documented campaigns such as Hide and Seek, Hajime and Fbot, newly discovered events portray the evolving nature of such IoT threat phenomena by demonstrating growing cryptojacking capabilities or by targeting industrial control services. To motivate empirical (and operational) IoT cyber security initiatives as well as aid in reproducibility of the obtained results, we make the source codes of all the developed methods and techniques available to the research community at large.

Keywords: Data science, Cyber forensics, Internet-of-Things, IoT security, Internet measurements
1. Introduction

With the escalating adoption of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm in critical infrastructure, smart homes, transportation, and numerous other realms, an increasing number of devices are becoming directly Internet-facing. Although IoT devices deployed behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway might be less vulnerable to Internet-enabled attacks, a plethora of such devices are directly connected to the Internet and/or employ port-forwarding for simplified provisioning and management [1]. Unfortunately, such devices often lack basic security protocols and measures, rendering them easy targets for exploitations and hence recruitment within coordinated IoT botnets [2]. Additionally, there exists several inherent IoT factors such as their heterogeneous nature and limited processing resources which further complicate addressing necessary security requirements. At the same time, subpar attention is being paid to IoT security aspects by their manufacturers and users [3, 4], on top of an overwhelming lack of maturity of IoT-specific update procedures for patch management [2].

Indeed, IoT security has been an emerging area of focus after Mirai [5] infected more than 200,000 devices to conduct debilitating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in late 2016, demonstrating the sheer malicious capabilities by way of exploiting IoT devices. Thereafter, botnets consisting of IoT devices have consistently been evolving, incorporating new devices and services. Hence, the IoT botnet environment has expanded to include several more players who ultimately compete for control over insecure IoT devices by means of newly-exposed vulnerabilities. In June 2019, the Echobot [6, 7] campaign was identified as operating “in the wild”. Derived from Mirai’s source code, Echobot has compromised millions of IoT nodes. Exploiting more than 20 unique (software and firmware) IoT-centric vulnerabilities, the campaign has infected devices across more than 10 diverse vendors. Indeed, this IoT threat phenomena will undoubtedly continue to display highly dynamic behavior as they attempt to propagate and exploit a higher number of devices, making the inference, attribution, and assessment of compromised IoT devices and their coordinated illicit activities significantly challenging.

Despite efforts to mitigate the ever-increasing IoT security issues, challenges exist due to the heterogeneity of IoT devices and the emergence of anti-honeypot techniques to avoid discovery [8, 9, 10]. Moreover, acquiring IoT-centric empirical data to be curated and analyzed for maliciousness is problematic, given the large-scale deployments of such devices in Internet-wide realms. While network telescope (darknet) traffic [11] (i.e., Internet-scale traffic targeting routable yet unused IP addresses) has proven to be a reliable and effective source for generating insights related to Internet-wide maliciousness [12, 13, 14, 15], its exploration for addressing IoT security issues is still in its infancy. Broadly, a major challenge related to the inference of IoT maliciousness through the analysis of network telescope traffic is the lack of sound data-driven artifacts which can be analyzed to confirm that the perceived one-way traffic is in fact originating from IoT devices and not from typical machines. Further, successful darknet-driven methodologies should accommodate the evolving nature of IoT botnets, leveraging their empirical specifications as perceived by the (somehow limited) vantage point of the network telescope.

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Correlating darknet-inferred IP addresses with databases such as Shodan [16] or Censys [17] has proven to be a successful use-case for classifying IoT-centric data and Internet-scale exploitations [18, 19, 20]. Both Shodan and Censys use IP crawlers, active scanning, and banner grabbing to collect and index open ports and available services on billions of Internet-facing IoT devices. While this strategy provides large-scale device information, the limited scope of services reachable by Shodan and Censys scanners makes them incapable for identifying the complete Internet-wide set of active IoT devices. Such generated probes and active measurements are typically filtered by firewalls. Additionally, upon infection, IoT malware tend to block ports, modify banner information and disable common outward facing services (i.e., Telnet, CWMP, ADB, etc.) [5, 21]. When the aforementioned events occur, the indexing of IoT devices is significantly impeded.

Having noted this, a number of darknet-related technical challenges exist which further hinder IoT-centric fingerprinting efforts. Indeed, perceived packets on the network telescope (that have been generated by IoT bots) solely resemble scan activities (i.e., do not include payload information and are unidirectional), which limits the amount of available data to analyze. Furthermore, only a small portion of unsolicited IoT-generated traffic actually targets deployed network telescopes, rendering time-based analysis non-trivial and complicates the process of extracting effective and robust features to infer orchestration behaviors of compromised IoT devices.

Motivated by the aforementioned limitations coupled with the lack of thorough measurement-based studies on the insecurity of the IoT paradigm at large, this paper contributes by proposing a multi-threaded, generic methodology for scrutinizing macroscopic darknet data to design, develop and evaluate:

- A novel darknet-specific, formal sanitization model that systematically identifies and filters out misconfiguration traffic to permit the storage and processing of network telescope data. The proposed darknet sanitization model does not rely on arbitrary cut-off thresholds, but instead provides likelihood models to distinguish between misconfiguration and other forms of darknet traffic, independent from the nature of the traffic sources. As a result, the proposed model neatly captures the natural behavior of darknet-targeted misconfiguration traffic.

- An IoT-centric fingerprinting approach rooted in deep learning and active measurements methodologies to infer Internet-scale compromised IoT devices by exclusively operating on network telescope data. The addressed problem herein is illustrated in Figure 1a. Using more than 3 TB of recent darknet data, the outcome of such a proposed approach exposes more than 400,000 compromised IoT devices from very well-known vendors. The results highlight that more than 75% of all the inferred IoT bots do not match the typical Mirai signature [5], concuring the evolving nature of this threat phenomena and highlighting the added-value of the proposed methodology.

- An IoT-specific botnet inference methodology based upon effective and lightweight (darknet) data-driven features and hierarchical agglomerative clustering. The addressed problem herein is shown in Figure 1b. The results from instrumenting such an approach uncover more than 300 “in the wild” IoT botnets, where close to 25 campaigns contain over 1,000 exploited, well-coordinated IoT bots. Moreover, IoT botnet-specific traits are investigated, including scanning modules, probing rates and their geo-distributions. While the results
Figure 1: Leveraging network telescopes to (a) devise learning techniques for fingerprinting IoT devices; and (b) develop clustering methods for identifying campaigns of orchestrated IoT devices

shed light on previously documented IoT botnets that were found to still be active, the outcome also uncovers new IoT botnets such as those possessing cryptojacking capabilities (which were shown to be coordinated by the same “player” due to the usage of the same key) and those that were inferred to be targeting industrial control systems. To facilitate the reproducibility of the results in addition to motivate passive Internet measurements for IoT security, we make all the developed methods and techniques available to the research and operational communities at large via https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to network telescope research, IoT device fingerprinting and IoT botnet analysis to demonstrate the state-of-the-art contributions of this work. In Section 3, we detail the darknet pre-processing model, the studied machine/deep learning models for fingerprinting compromised IoT devices, in addition to elaborating on the IoT-centric botnet inference methodology. In Section 4, we report and discuss the results derived from executing the proposed approach. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the contributions of this paper and paves the way for future work by addressing a number of limitations.

2. Related Work

In this section, we review three topics central to the contemporary IoT security landscape. The first focuses on network telescopes as a powerful mechanism to capture IoT-specific, illicit network traffic. The second summarizes efforts pertaining to IoT device fingerprinting. Finally, we enumerate the literature related to IoT-specific botnet analysis.
Network telescopes and IoT Security. A network telescope (i.e., darknet), is a set of routable, allocated, yet unused IP addresses deployed in order to passively observe incoming Internet-scale traffic [11]. Since these IP addresses are not associated with any services, traffic targeting them is unsolicited [22]. Such traffic originates from infected devices scanning the Internet space, victims of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, or misconfiguration caused by hardware/software errors or improper routing. Network telescopes are reliable sources for investigating large-scale, Internet-wide activities, which is supported by recent examples of successful applications including studies on probing activities [23, 24, 25] and DDoS attacks [26, 27]. In the context of assessing the maliciousness of IoT devices through network telescopes, Torabi et al. [19] recently conducted large-scale correlations between passive measurements and IoT-relevant information to investigate and disclose malicious activities associated with more than 26,000 IoT devices, including those within critical infrastructure. Leveraging a large-scale network telescope, the authors categorized the ports and services targeted by scans within the network telescope, attributing them to infected IoT devices and identifying active threats (i.e, IoT devices launching brute-force SSH attacks). Similarly, by correlating active measurements with collected network telescope data, Shaikh et al. [20] examined nearly 14,000 compromised IoT devices and extracted malicious signatures for mitigation in IoT hosting environments. Further investigation of the collected network traffic revealed that nearly 20% of the identified IoT devices were related to DDoS attacks. Moreover, by means of applying filters to network telescope data in order to discern Mirai-relevant traffic, Antonakakis et al. [5] were able to gather IoT-related information pertaining to roughly 1.2 million Mirai-infected IP addresses during 8 months. Their work revealed crucial details of the Mirai malware’s attack vectors, such as targeted ports (TCP/Telnet:23 and TCP/Telnet:2323). Furthermore, after correlating their results with Censys [28] scans, the authors fingerprinted the device types of Mirai-infected bots - confirming the IoT-centric composition of the botnet. In a related study, Cetin et al. [29] collected network traffic across a 300,000 IP darknet space to conduct empirical studies focusing on IoT malware cleanup efforts and remediation rates in a medium-sized Internet Service Provider (ISP). Combining network traffic received within their darknet with malware binaries retrieved from an IoT-based honeypot and IP addresses retrieved from Internet scanners Censys and Nmap, the authors tracked the success (and failure) of remediation efforts, reporting device reinfection rates.

While such contributions are noteworthy, several shortcomings exist. First, previous works rely on a specific IoT malware signature (e.g., the Mirai-specific signature of tcpSeq == dstIP). Not every IoT bot will follow such an easily identifiable signature, preventing comprehensive identification of Internet-scale botnets “in the wild”. In fact, our measurements have revealed that less than 25% of all the inferred IoT bots match the Mirai-specific signature. Second, the majority of these related works solely depend on databases gathered by Internet scanning services (e.g., Censys and Shodan), which might not be able to accurately identify every infected IoT device at a global scale. Antonakakis et al. discovered that upon infection, the Mirai malware closed a number of ports and services on newly exploited IoT bots to prevent infection by competing malware [5]. As a result of such territorial nature, Internet search engines are unable to discover a large portion of infected devices due to the similarities between their discovery methods and malware scanning trends. In contrast, we aim to create a more comprehensive view of the aforesaid IoT bot populations by proposing a novel approach that synergistically leverages passive, darknet-centric assessments coupled with active, Internet-scale measurements and machine/deep learning techniques.
**IoT device fingerprinting.** Previous works that propose IoT inference methods rely on text information retrieved from service banners, gathered by active measurements (e.g., port scanning and banner grabbing), or provided by Internet scanning services similar to Shodan [16], Censys [28] and ZoomEye [30]. For example, Kumar et al. [31] leveraged predefined text rules from Censys to fingerprint consumer IoT devices, designing an ensemble of four supervised classifiers on UPnP and DNS responses, HTTP data banners, and network-layer information. Alternatively, several research efforts have elected to attempt IoT device fingerprinting by solely observing network traffic. For instance, Guo et al. [32] postulated that because IoT devices regularly exchange data with servers managed by their manufacturers, IoT device type and vendor can be fingerprinted by observing the exchanged flow-level network traffic between devices and servers. After discovering nearly 200 candidate servers accessed by 26 devices across 15 vendors, their methodology successfully identified IoT devices connected across the University of Southern California (USC). In another work, Meidan et al. [33] explored a localized lab environment to extract TCP packet features from a variety of IoT devices, including baby monitors, IP cameras, and printers. Extracted features were employed to train a supervised learning algorithm in order to distinguish between IoT devices and non-IoT. Moreover, Miettinen et al. [34] leveraged network traffic generated by IoT devices during their setup process for capturing device-specific traits. A number of automatic requests and updates were collected and subsequently mapped as signatures, detailing the device type by way of random forest classification. Improving upon anomaly detection premised on device types, Nguyen et al. [35] have recently implemented a machine learning algorithm which discriminates between the corresponding classes of devices, but exhibited remarkable performance with detection rate 95.6%. Similarly, Thangavelu et al. [36] developed a machine learning-based methodology capable of fingerprinting distributed devices. Their work overcomes previous limitations hindering centralized approaches by offering a scalable and dynamic methodology.

Pinheiro et al. [37] developed algorithms for distinguishing between IoT and non-IoT devices based upon packet specifications. The mean and standard deviation of the packet length were combined with the number of bytes transmitted by each device in one-second time intervals to accurately profile devices. Further, Siby et al. [38] detected devices in a local network by passively intercepting and recording wireless signals. Extracting the encapsulated MAC addresses from investigated flows allowed for IoT device identification. In an alternative approach, Acar et al. [39] implemented a web script to identify the presence of IoT devices running local HTTP servers. Once identified, IoT vulnerabilities are disclosed, specifically the unauthorized accessing of such IoT devices through DNS rebinding.

A shortcoming of the aforementioned literature is that their scope is limited to local IoT networks. Therefore, they do not present an Internet-wide perspective; hence, their proposed approaches are not applicable on one-way scan flows arriving at network telescopes. In contrast, we leverage a large-scale network telescope to collect Internet-wide network traffic, followed by the deployment of a strict rule set used to fingerprint hosts that respond with banners when probed. Additionally, we devise learning techniques to identify unreachable infected hosts and predict their device types using innovative features extracted from sequences of TCP SYN packets arriving at the network telescope.

**IoT botnet analysis.** The discovery and analysis of IoT-centric botnets reveal crucial cyber threat intelligence relating to the discovery of malware attack vectors and disclose possible vulnerabilities or intrusion points within globally-deployed IoT devices. Within the context of bot-
net analysis through tailored honeypots, Pa et al. [40] inferred several malware families by constructing a honeypot to analyze attacks against Telnet services. Dubbed as IoTPOT, the honeypot was specifically tailored to mimic the CPU architectures of various IoT devices, while learning how to respond to command interactions. Furthermore, Guarnizado et al. [41] designed the IoT-centric Scalable high-Interaction Honeypot (SIPHON) which demonstrated effectiveness to attract a tremendous amount of malicious IoT botnet-generated traffic (ranging from 50,000 to 600,000 attempted TCP connections) through a combination of worldwide wormholes and a small number of deployed IoT devices. The deployed SIPHON honeypot recorded hundreds of brute-force password attacks and retrieved credential dictionaries used for these attacks. Moreover, Metongnon and Sadre [42] reported on a large number of exploited IoT protocols, based on an in-depth analysis of network traffic from IoT-centric honeypots and network telescopes.

While such works provide crucial IoT-centric botnet analysis, given the copious amounts of IoT hardware in the wild and their accompanying heterogeneity, we note that honeypot-based methodologies frequently fail at mimicking the entirety of IoT device and firmware vulnerabilities. However, capturing such characteristics are essential to characterizing and attributing large-scale IoT botnets. Additionally, the vantage points of honeypots are typically quite small, hindering their effectiveness in tracking Internet-scale IoT botnets as well as accurately estimating their population size.

Rather than deploying honeypots, alternative works attempted to identify compromised IoT devices (bots) in local networks. For example, Meidan et al. [43] proposed a novel, host-based intrusion detection system (IDS) that monitors a device’s typical behaviors through analyzing its network traffic using autoencoders. The IDS creates a snapshot of what the device is expected to be communicating, and will subsequently raise an alarm if any deviations or anomalies are detected. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IDS, nine commercial IoT devices were deployed in a controlled environment to generate benign traffic. These devices were then infected with two very notorious IoT malware, Mirai and BASHLITE, and tested the IDS capabilities for identifying the newly corrupted traffic flows. Further, Nguyen et al. [44] present an autonomous self-learning distributed system for detecting compromised IoT devices, leveraging federated learning technique to aggregate IoT device fingerprints. These fingerprints are then clustered and categorized based on device type and models. Next, a K-Nearest Neighbors classifier identified abnormal network traffic to discover compromised IoT devices. Evaluated on 30 different devices and selected Mirai malware for the real-world case study, ultimately, the methodology achieved a 94% detection rate and 257ms average detection time.

Alternatively, other literature works consider a macroscopic approach for generic botnet analysis by aggregating information from various sources. To this end, Gu et al. [45] proposed a system for correlating aggregated IDS log files with extracted features from network flows to detect botnet activities. The system assumed that hosts infected with the same malware behave in a similar manner and that bot-generated flows captured within the IDS logs will share many of the same characteristics. Subsequently, they were clustered in a two-stage, high dimensional classifier for identifying botnet campaigns. The evaluation results on a university campus reveal a botnet detection rate of 99.6%. Similarly, Homayoun et al. [46] proposed BoTShark, primarily using deep learning models such as autoencoders and convolutional neural networks relying on captured netflows to efficiently detect malicious traffic. With a true positive rate of 0.91 and a false positive rate of 0.13, BoTShark successfully detected malicious traffic signatures of botnet campaigns.

Additionally, different works attempted to identify and characterize IoT botnets through passively collecting one-way network traffic. Araki et al. [47] proposed a methodology that not only
detected bots, but classified their primary behaviors and characteristics. Utilizing a two-step subspace clustering method to cluster botnets and clarify partial characteristics (such as low-size flows or high TCP-SYN packet rates), the methodology was evaluated on two real-world datasets, collected by upstream, backbone ISPs. Similarly, Ozawa et al. [48] studied IoT botnet characteristics by way of analyzing their scan activities. The authors applied associate rule learning [49] on network telescope features such as destination ports, ToS, and TCP window sizes to discover the activities of bots that were infected with well-known malware. Their work reported interesting observations on the evolution of IoT botnet characteristics before and after the release of the Mirai's source code.

In contrast, other works specifically focused on a single IoT botnet family to retrieve relevant attack vectors and behavior, such as the Mirai botnet [5]. Another example includes, Herwig et al. [21] who provided a comprehensive investigation related to the Hajime IoT botnet, revealing crucial insights such as Hajime’s atypical infrastructure. Deviating from typical command and control infrastructures that rely on bots to communicate with infected servers to receive orders, instead relying on peer to peer connections between bots and utilizing the BitTorrent protocol to transfer payloads. To summarize such contributions, Table 1 provides a brief classification of recent selected works using different dimensions.

### Table 1: Summary of selected recent botnet detection literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Employed Data Type</th>
<th>Botnet Class</th>
<th>Methodology and Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[46]</td>
<td>NetFlow</td>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>Autoencoder/CNN. Evaluated on combined botnet traffic ISCX [50].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[47]</td>
<td>xFlow</td>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>Two-step Subspace Clustering. Tested on real-world ISP traffic and MAWI [51].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[21]</td>
<td>Active Scanning/ Root DNS backscatter traffic</td>
<td>Hajime</td>
<td>Bug in P2P infrastructure while observing the effect on samples of all queries to the D-root DNS root server.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The aforementioned works present significant and important analysis of IoT botnets; however, a number of limitations prevent them from offering a generic, Internet-wide perspective of global IoT botnet populations. Target-specific studies designed to investigate a singular IoT botnet take advantage of known botnet infrastructure or signatures, and in turn cannot be replicated or generalized to study other IoT botnets. Furthermore, the vantage point offered by the honeypots, results in limited exposure when compared with one offered by a network telescope. To this end, in this work, we complement and expand upon previous contributions by developing a purely passive methodology to not only identify Internet-scale compromised IoT devices, but also to infer ongoing IoT botnets by capturing their orchestrated artifacts.

3. Proposed methodology

This section details the proposed approach as depicted in Figure 2. Its core components include (i) data collection and dataset preparation, which introduces the darknet sanitization probabilistic model to filter out misconfiguration traffic along with the inference of Internet-scale probing activities and labeling their sources; (ii) the systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art machine learning and deep learning classifiers for fingerprinting compromised IoT devices; and (iii) the feature engineering process coupled with executing hierarchical agglomerative clustering to infer and report on IoT botnets. These steps are subsequently detailed.

3.1. Network telescope sanitization model

As previously noted, network telescopes, most commonly known as darknets [11], constitute a set of allocated and routable, yet unused, IP addresses. Since these addresses do not operate legitimate services, any traffic targeting them is considered unsolicited. From a deployment perspective, network telescopes are commonly distributed on specific Internet IP subspaces operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), educational entities and corporate backbone networks. Darknet IP addresses are, by nature, indistinguishable from other routable addresses, rendering them an effective technique to amalgamate Internet-wide, one-way unsolicited network traffic.

Although network telescope (darknet) data predominantly consists of malicious packets originating from probes, backscattered packets from victims of DDoS attacks, and malware propagation attempts, it also contains misconfiguration traffic. The latter Non-malicious packets frequently result from network, routing, hardware, or software faults that were erroneously directed
towards a darknet. Such traffic might also be an artifact of improper configurations during darknet deployment. Misconfiguration traffic [11] impedes the proper functioning of cyber threat intelligence algorithms operating on darknet data, which often yields numerous undesirable false positives and false negatives and waste of valuable storage resources. Given the lack of formalism in addressing this problem, the objective herein is to elaborate on a probabilistic model that is specifically tailored towards the preprocessing of darknet data by way of fingerprinting, and in turn, filtering out embedded misconfiguration traffic.

In brief, the model formulates and computes the probability metrics of misconfigured traffic, while capturing the behavioral perspective of misconfiguration flows as they target the darknet space. Regarding the natural tendencies associated with typical network flows, the model initially estimates the rarity of hosts attempting to access the destination address. Secondly, the scope of access is considered, accounting for the number of distinct darknet IP addresses that a specific remote source has accessed, preserving the unique characteristics of the misconfiguration flow. Subsequently, the joint probability is formulated, computed, and compared. If the probability of the source generating a misconfiguration flow is higher than that of the source being malicious (or unsolicited), then that particular source is deemed to be generating misconfiguration traffic, flagged, and the corresponding flows are filtered out. In the following, we detail the notions of both rareness and scope of access.

Let $D = \{d_1, d_2, d_3, \cdots\}$ represent the set of darknet IP addresses, with $D$, being a subset of those accessed by source $s_i$. First, the model captures how unusual these accessed destinations are. The underlying idea in doing so stems from the fact that misconfigured sources target destinations seldom called upon by others [52]. Thus, the model estimates the distribution of a darknet IP address as being accessed by such a source as

$$P_{misc}(d_i) = \frac{n_i(d_i)}{\sum_{d_j \in D} n_i(d_j)}, \quad (1)$$

where $n_i(d_i)$ is the number of sources that have accessed $d_i$; in contrast, a malicious darknet source will target a given destination at random. Typically, defining a suitable probability distribution to exemplify the randomness of a malicious source taking aim at a specific darknet destination is quite tedious; therefore, a simplistic assumption is often applied to resolve this potential headache. In this context, Durumeric et al. [53] demonstrated that sources probe their darknet targets following a Gaussian distribution. By adopting that assumption, one can model the probability of a darknet destination being accessed by a malicious source as

$$P_{mal}(d_i) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma}e^{-x^2/2\sigma^2}$$

where $\sigma$ is the standard deviation, $\mu$ is the mean, $\sigma^2$ is the variance, and $x$ is the location of the darknet destination following the aforementioned distribution. Recall that not only does the model capture how unusual the accessed destinations are, but it also considers the number of darknet destinations accessed by a particular source, which we subsequently describe. Given a set of $D_i$ darknet destinations accessed by a specific source $s_i$, the model ultimately measures two probability distributions, namely, $P_{misc}(D_i)$ and $P_{mal}(D_i)$; the former being the probability that $D_i$ has been generated by a misconfigured source and the latter originating from that with a malicious intent towards darknet $D_i$. For example, if the darknet addresses accessed by $s_1$ are $D_1 = \{d_{11}, d_{12}, d_{13}\}$, $P(D_1)$ equates to the probability of $s_1$ accessing the specific combination of addresses $\{d_{11}, d_{12}, d_{13}\}$ given three targeted destinations, multiplied by the probability of $s_1$ accessing any three destinations. In turn, we can generalize $P(D_i)$ as

$$P(D_i) = P(D_i = \{d_{i1}, d_{i2}, \cdots, d_{in}\} \mid |D_i| = n) \times P(|D_i| = n). \quad (2)$$
For both a misconfigured and malicious source, the first term of equation (2) can be modeled as

\[ P(D_i = \{d_{i1}, d_{i2}, \cdots \} \mid |D_i|) = \frac{1}{K} \prod_{d_j \in D_i} P(d_j) \]  

(3)

where K, acting as a normalization constant and solely being used as a means of summing the probabilities to 1, could be defined as \( K = \frac{|D|^n}{n!(|D|-n)!} \times \frac{1}{|D|^n} \). K is a standard normalization constant often employed in Bayesian probability [54]. Moreover, n encompasses all sources in the data, whereas |D| represents the darknet IP space. Consequently, the likelihood that a source will target a certain number of darknet destinations (i.e., the second term of equation (2)) depends upon whether it is malicious or misconfigured. Characteristically, misconfigured sources access one or few destinations while those with malicious intent target a larger pool. Accordingly, we model such distributions as

\[ P_{misc}(|D_i|) = \frac{1}{(e-1)|D_i|!} \]  

(4)

\[ P_{mal}(|D_i|) = \frac{1}{|D_i|} \]  

(5)

where the term \((e-1)\) in equation (4) ensures the distribution’s summation equals 1. Equation (4) guarantees a significant decrease in the probability as the number of targeted destinations increases. In contrast, equation (5) captures that of a random number of darknet addresses being accessed by a malicious source. Thereby, via plugging in of equations (4) and (5) into (3), respectively, we can represent the probability of a source being either misconfigured or malicious, given a set of darknet destination addresses, as

\[ P_{misc}(D_i) = \frac{1}{K(e-1)|D_i|!} \prod_{d_j \in D_i} P_{misc}(d_j) \]  

(6)

\[ P_{mal}(D_i) = \frac{1}{K|D_i|} \prod_{d_j \in D_i} P_{mal}(d_j). \]  

(7)

Equations (6) and (7) provide two distinct likelihood models to distinguish between misconfiguration and malicious, darknet-bound traffic, which enables their simplified and systematic post-processing. Furthermore, as the proposed model generalizes and formalizes the concepts of misconfiguration and malicious darknet traffic, it does not make any assumptions regarding the nature of the sources from which the given types of traffic are originating. Thus, the method deems a source and its corresponding flows as misconfiguration traffic if \( \ln P_{misc}(D_i) - \ln P_{mal}(D_i) > 0 \). To effectively employ the proposed network telescope sanitization model, we present Algorithm 1, which provides a simplistic yet effective mechanism to flag misconfigured sources.

Since the field of Internet measurements for cyber security heavily relies on processing network telescope data [11, 55], we make the model’s code available to researchers and security operators at large from https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT/tree/master/Darknet%20Sanitization.

3.2. Data collection and dataset preparation

This section summarizes the methodology used to infer probing activities captured at a network telescope. We also detail the proposed mechanisms for feature engineering and active measurements, in order to fingerprint IoT devices through data-driven learning.
Algorithm 1 Network Telescope Sanitization Algorithm

Input: Darknet Flows, DarkFlows

Output: Flag, MiscFlag, indicating that the respective flow is originating from a misconfigured source

for DarkFlows do
    MiscFlag ← 0
    i ← DarkFlows.getUniqueSources()
    Amalgamate DarkFlows, originating from a specific source $s_i$
    Update $s_i(D_i)$
    Compute $P_{misc}(D_i)$, $P_{mal}(D_i)$
    if $P_{misc}(D_i) > P_{mal}(D_i)$ then
        MiscFlag ← 1
    end if
end for

3.2.1. Inferring probing activities

After employing the aforementioned pre-processing steps to sanitize misconfiguration traffic, the aim is to dissect the malicious traffic in order to extract probing flows as perceived by a network telescope as indicators of exploitation. This is achieved through a Threshold Random Walk (TRW)-based probing detection algorithm [56]. The TRW algorithm searches for subsequent packets from the same source IP address for a duration of 300 seconds. If the time-based threshold is exceeded without receiving a packet, the given counter is reset. If the threshold has held and the duration has not expired, the counter is incremented. If the counter reaches a threshold of 64 [57], the flow is deemed as a probing event.

3.2.2. Feature extraction for IoT classification

Following the amalgamation of packets into flows, the first $t$ consecutive packets are extracted from each. Given that the majority of the observed scanning traffic are TCP SYN scans, the applicable features reside in the TCP and IP header fields (i.e., ToS, Total Length, Identification, TTL, Dst IP Address, srcPort, dstPort, TCP SEQ, TCP ACK SEQ, TCP offset, TCP DATA Length, TCP Reserve, TCP Flags, TCP Win, TCP URP, TCP options, Packet Inter-arrival Time). Overall, along with the inter-arrival time of the consecutive packets within a flow, $d = 17$ features are gathered for each packet. In turn, the data samples for each scanner IP address would consist of a $t \times d$ matrix. To elaborate on the model’s training procedure, we subsequently detail the labeling process.

3.2.3. Port scanning and banner grabbing

In order to annotate decidedly accurate labels for the training dataset, it was imperative to perform the procedure herein upon detection of a scan activity to circumvent any potential complications due to the dynamic reallocation of the associated device’s IP address (through DHCP, for instance). To accomplish this, we utilized the gigabit open-source Internet scanning tool ZMap [58] as well as the high-speed application scanner ZGrab [59], in tandem, to provide comprehensive results necessary for guaranteeing the versatility of the classification task. Specifically, ZMap was used to probe 45 ports\textsuperscript{1} of the IP addresses (that were previously inferred as probing

\textsuperscript{1}https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT/blob/master/Port-List.txt.
sources) that were found to be active. The port list is selected based on reports by ZoomEye [30] during a one month analysis of returned banners, chosen to cover most of the default ports of various devices in order to maximize the number of captured banners. Furthermore, via ZGrab, we obtained banner fields and application handshakes from various protocols such as HTTP(s), CWMP, TELNET, SMTP(s), IMAP(s), POP3(s), SSH, FTP, SMB, DNP3, MODBUS, BACNET, FOX, Siemens S7 and SSL certificates. Additionally, we designed and developed two custom scanning modules to extract RTSP and SIP banners.

3.2.4. Tagging and Labeling

To label discovered IoT devices, we amalgamated a comprehensive list of keywords related to major Internet-facing IoT devices and vendors. As previously noted, these are typically the devices that are most targeted by IoT botnets. This list consists of devices provided by Nmap along with results from ZoomEye Internet Scanner[30] and ZTag, Censys’s tagging module[31]. Although it is unrealistic to claim that we cover all IoT products from every manufacturer and vendor, we carefully leverage information from various sources and focused on widely deployed Internet devices. In addition, we implemented a parsing algorithm which extracts useful keywords from banners and SSL certificates such as the combination of letters, digits, “-” and “:” signs, which typically represent device models[60] to enrich our list of devices. We further considered devices running multi-purpose OSs as non-IoT, which were identified using keywords such as “Win64”, “Ubuntu”, “Microsoft IIS” and “CentOS”, etc. while we deemed other specialized devices as IoT where their OS types were indicated as being “embedded”, “RouterOS”, “FritzOS” etc. For example “TD-W8960N” is a sample key-
word in the database related to a TP-LINK router that is marked as IoT. The prepared database consists of 3,286 patterns related to 1,121 vendors. We make this list publicly available at https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT/blob/master/devices.txt. Given that not all scanning events are illicit in nature (e.g., academic institutions conducting research) such entities will incorporate information into their banners. Thereby, we leverage banners, coupled with a Greynoise list[61], to filter out these benign scanners[4].

3.3. Model training for fingerprinting compromised IoT devices

We propose herein a learning approach for the extraction of embedded features within unsolicited scan flows for the training of a binary classifier which distinguishes between traffic originating from both malicious IoT and non-IoT devices. The underlying methodology is based upon determining similarities in network traffic that are exclusively associated with IoT devices and their corresponding IoT malware in order to fingerprint flows originating from them. Additionally, it is known that IoT products manufactured by the same vendor possess a uniform, low-level architecture such as sharing a similar network card, operating system, etc., and happen to share the same TCP/IP stack information, including but not limited to TTL value and initial TCP window size, thus permitting the fingerprinting of IP addresses that Internet scanning services (i.e., Shodan) may have overlooked or could not identify.

To select a suitable and sound learning technique, we compare and contrast the performance of five models to permit the classification of compromised IoT devices in order to distinguish

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[1]https://www.zoomeye.org/component

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them from compromised, multi-purpose hosts. The first three are based on Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) deep learning models. Deep learning is an emerging branch of machine learning that uses multiple layers of neural networks, backpropagation, and error correction to automatically learn features (i.e., representations) from a given data input. CNN is a state-of-the-art deep learning algorithm that uses dynamic kernels along a given data input to automatically extracts (i.e., pool) features. To this end, we assess a two-dimensional CNN (2D-CNN), a one-dimensional CNN (1D-CNN) [62] and a multi-window one-dimensional CNN (MW-1D-CNN) [63] in addition to two “shallow” learning methods rooted in Random Forest (RF) models.

In this context, an input sample consists of a matrix representation \( X \) of a flow with \( t \) packets and the number of extracted fields \( d \) from a packet is considered, yielding \( X \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times d} \). Namely, the \( t \)th packet in a given flow is \( x_t \in \mathbb{R}^d \). Convolution operations are also defined by applying local kernels \( w \in \mathbb{R}^{b \times w} \) on the input to extract spatially local correlations in the data. In terms of the 2D-CNN model, it contains \( L \) number of consecutive two dimensional convolutional layers (with \( k \) kernels of size \( w \times w \)) and max pooling, followed by two dense hidden layers of sizes 64 and 32, respectively, and a Softmax classifier at the end (Figure 3a). The 1D-CNN model has a similar architecture to the 2D-CNN, but instead, the convolution kernels have a fixed kernel width equal to the input sample width (i.e., \( h \times d \)) (Figure 3b). Further, the MW-1D-CNN model mixes the outputs of various kernel heights \( h \) to capture the features. In turn, the output of the first layer of the proposed model is given by \( c_i = f(w \cdot x_{i+h-1} + b) \), where \( x_{i+h-1} \) defines the notation for a sequence of packets \( x, x_{i+1}, \ldots, x_{i+h-1} \), \( b \) representing the bias, and \( f \) denoting the non-linear activation function. The filter is applied to each 2D sample instance to produce a feature map \( c = [c_1, \ldots, c_l] \). Subsequently, max pooling is applied over the feature map \( c \), taking the value \( \max c \). We used kernels \( w \) of different window heights \( h \) (\( h = [2, 4, 6, \ldots, h_{max}] \)) to enable the capture of varying dynamics specific to darknet packet flows (Figure 3c).

We also devise two RF models. The first was constructed based on raw packet features. The second operates on statistical features. We define feature statistics as the 5-tuple \([\text{min}, \text{1-quantile}, \text{median}, \text{3-quantile}, \text{max}]\) of each field in flows of packets, which overall produces 85 features. These statistics can be considered as an estimation of the probability distribution function related to each field of the packet sequence in each flow. Please note that we make available the source code of the developed models, including their specificities from https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT/tree/master/IoT%20classifier%20models.

### 3.4. IoT botnets: features’ extraction and campaign inference

Following the binary classification of IoT-generated scanning activities while filtering out non-IoT sources by employing the developed model, we conduct a thorough investigation on each individual flow’s characteristics \( \text{Flow}_{IP} \). Such flows are comprised of at least 500 (\( t \geq 500 \)) sequential packets, originating from a particular unsolicited IoT device. We proceed by extracting the corresponding feature set from aggregated flows \( \text{Flow}_{IP} = \langle \text{Ports}_{IP}, \text{Flag}_{IP}, \text{ARR}_{IP} \rangle. \) \( \text{Ports}_{IP} \) is the grouping of the targeted transport protocols paired with their associated ports in ascending order (e.g., \( \text{Ports}_{IP} = \langle \text{TCP:23}, \text{TCP:80}, \text{TCP:8080} \rangle \)). In turn, \( \text{Flag}_{IP} \) is the corresponding discrete probability distribution function which represents the frequency of appearance of each of these ports within the given flow of packets (e.g., \( \text{Flag}_{IP} = [0.15, 0.70, 0.15] \)). This is relevant since IoT devices typically possess a limited supply of resources. As a result, in the midst of conducting illicit scanning activities, they are often allocated to different ports and
weighted based on the expected return. $Flag_{IP}$ is Boolean, holding a value 1 if the IoT device conducting the scanning has the signature $tcpSeq == dstIP$ and 0 otherwise. This inference provides insights about a Mirai-like behavior, possibly indicating a variant or a code-reuse practice. Lastly, the Address Repetition Ratio, or $ARR_{IP}$, is the ratio of the total number of packets sent by a source IP address over the number of unique destination IP addresses, and is defined as $ARR_{IP} = \frac{|Flow_{src}|}{\sum_{dstIP} |Flow_{src}|}$. Such scenarios as an $ARR_{IP}$ greater than one are a consequence of the sending of multiple packets to a particular destination in order to compensate for packet loss and/or the probing of multiple ports at each destination. Note that, each instance of the same probing campaign will exhibit an equivalent $ARR_{IP}$ due to the underlying IoT orchestrated probing machinery.

**Minimum number of packets ($t$) for robust feature estimation.** To derive an accurate estimation of the discrete probability distribution $\pi$, we perform statistical analysis to compute a suitable $t$. By generating a lower bound on the number of packets, we can guarantee a minimum error of 5% within a confidence level of 0.5. Note that within the /8 network telescope, scan packets arrive with a random probability of 1/256, resembling the random sampling procedure. We consider the population of scan packets originated by a compromised IoT device, and adopt a simple random sampling mechanism, as shown in equation (8) [64], to derive a lower bound on the sample size (equivalently, the number of received packets within the network telescope). The method herein is thus used to estimate the minimum sample size necessary to find the lower bound. By leveraging the requirements of a population proportion interval [64], we perform the estimation at a $1 - \alpha$ confidence level, margin of error $E$ and a planned proportion estimate $p$. By selecting more than $n_0$ samples, we assure that the probability that the actual error to be larger...
than $E$ is not more than a small value $\alpha$, i.e., $Pr(|p - \mu| \geq E) = \alpha$; where $z_{\alpha/2}$ is the 100(1 - $\alpha/2$) percentile of the standard normal distribution.

$$n_0 = \frac{z^2_{\alpha/2}p(1-p)}{E^2}$$

Since the product $p(1-p)$ increases as $p$ moves toward 0.5, a conservative estimation of the sample size is obtained by choosing $p = 0.5$, regardless of the actual estimated value of $p$. Therefore, using a 0.5 planned portion estimate, the sample size needed to achieve a 5% margin of error at 95% confidence level is computed at 385. In this work, we select the number of packets equal to 500 (≥ 385) to significantly minimize the risk of errors in the extracted features, namely $\pi$, to avoid subsequent issues in clustering and campaign detection.

**Clustering mechanism.** We hierarchically divide the IP addresses of the IoT scanners into separate groups $G_i$ based on the given $\text{Ports}_{IP}$, $\text{Flag}_{IP}$ and $\text{ARR}_{IP}$ of their feature set $F_{IP}$. Upon completion, we cluster members of each group $G_i$ to identify those scanning for the same set of ports but with a different probability distribution function $\pi$. This enables us to leverage hierarchical agglomerative clustering [65], which determines the proximity matrix by calculating the distance between every pair of probability distribution functions $\{\pi_{IP}|IP \in G_i\}$ based upon the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) [66] distance metric. JSD, defined in (9), estimates the distance between two discrete distribution functions, and is the symmetrized version of the well-known Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD).

$$JS D(\pi_i||\pi_j) = \frac{1}{2}KLD(\pi_i||M) + \frac{1}{2}KLD(\pi_j||M),$$

where $M = \frac{1}{2}(\pi_i + \pi_j)$, and $KLD(P||Q) = - \sum P(i) \log \left(\frac{Q(i)}{P(i)}\right)$ for discrete PDF $P$ and $Q$.

We select hierarchical agglomerative clustering due to the fact that based on statistical analysis, the estimated $\pi$ values are within the specific distance from the actual distribution (cluster centers) with high confidence. Therefore, it can correctly identify centers by merging close samples and executing a bottom-up approach. In addition, other clustering methods (such as $k$-means) assume equal cluster sizes which is not correct in the context of IoT campaigns while density-based techniques (such as DBSCAN [67]) are only suitable when the density of the data is non-uniform and the clusters can be shaped arbitrarily. As noted, hierarchical agglomerative clustering operates in a bottom-up fashion. Each observation forms its own cluster and begins moving up the distance-based hierarchy, subsequently merging with the clusters. To designate appropriate consolidation, we use a distance threshold (0.05) in which merging only occurs if the distance between the two given cluster centers falls beneath.

4. Empirical evaluation

The evaluation was executed using 3.6 TB of darknet traffic that was collected throughout a 24-hour period on December 13th, 2018. This data is provided by the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) /8 network telescope. While this specific dataset per se is subject to MOUs and thus cannot be shared as is, interested readers can request access to CAIDA’s real-time darknet data through DHS IMPACT [68]. Additionally, while we make available a sample collected at another /13 darknet IP space available through the GitHub repository for
experimentation purposes, the developed and open-source methods are generic enough to be applied on any darknet data within any desired time frame.

4.1. Results of the darknet sanitization model

By executing the proposed model of Section 3.1, the distribution of malicious and misconfiguration traffic with respect to the number of packets was found to be 88.21% and 11.79%, while the distribution of source IP addresses was 26.17% and 73.83%, respectively. Validation of such outcome revealed that close to 90% of the misconfiguration traffic defines packets that hit the /8 network telescope only once, while the remaining appeared to be malformed packets. Further, it can be observed that even though misconfiguration traffic is relatively low (11.79%), it is responsible for a large proportion of the source IP addresses (73.83%). These findings shed more light on the problematic nature of misconfiguration traffic with regards to Internet measurements via network telescopes and emphasize the effectiveness of the proposed pre-processing model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Malicious</th>
<th>Misconfiguration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>88.21%</td>
<td>11.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.17%</td>
<td>73.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distribution of malicious and misconfiguration traffic in the /8 network telescope dataset

In terms of runtime, the implementation heavily relied on the Linux-derived libpcap C++ library while running on an Ubuntu 18.04 system. Testing our model on a machine with a quad core Intel i7-8550 at 1.80GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM, the developed approach processed 8GB files containing close to 67.5 million packets with an average 636 second execution time, consuming close to 11.6 GB of RAM. We believe runtime can be considerably improved by using SSD storage (since most of the delay was I/O related) and adopting multithreading.

4.2. Results of dataset preparation

Regarding the data collection and dataset preparation steps of Section 3.2, and by immediately scanning back about 1.7M Internet scanners inferred through the network telescope, about 25.84% of them were found to have at least one open port. Further, amongst the total 543,392 gathered banners, the majority were HTTP (54.11%), FTP (11.10%), SSL Certificate (10.50%), TELNET (10.19%), RTSP (7.00%), and CWMP (2.60%). We were able to distinguish between 45,184 IoT and 7,763 non-IoT devices to generate the training dataset. At this juncture, the label and corresponding metadata were incorporated into $t \times d$ training and test data matrices of IoT and non-IoT devices. We shuffled the training dataset and then performed normalization by way of the Min-Max method [69]. Subsequently, we computed and removed the mean. To evaluate the proposed model, we trained it using a prepared dataset captured in November 2018 and then tested it using our dataset from December 2018. The one month gap between the training and test datasets ensured that there exists no correlation between them for sound evaluation. The test dataset consisted of 34,974 IoT and 7,193 non-IoT sources.

4.3. Evaluating the IoT classification models

The proposed CNN models were implemented in Keras [70]. To address the problem of class imbalance within the training dataset, cost-sensitive learning was applied [71]. The number
of epochs was found to be 30 to avoid over-fitting. Further, we performed a search on sub-
spaces of hyper-parameters as presented in Table 3, leveraging Tree-structured Parzen Estimator
(TPE) [72] in Hyperas [73], and selected the best model (out of 100 trials) with regards to the
loss. RF models were implemented and trained using the scikit-learn [74] package. The best
model was retrieved based upon random search (using the RandomizedSearchCV method) in the
search space as summarized in Table 4. In Tables 3 and 4, parameter ranges are reported with
begin:step:end format. For evaluating the CNN models, we leverage an NVIDIA GeForce
RTX 2070 GPU with 8GB of memory, 2304 CUDA cores and 288 Tensor cores to accommodate
for parallelization.

Table 3: Tuned hyperparameters of the selected CNN models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>2D-CNN</th>
<th>1D-CNN</th>
<th>MW-1D-CNN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimizer</td>
<td>SGD, Adam, RMSProp</td>
<td>RMSProp</td>
<td>RMSProp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. of kernels (k)</td>
<td>32,64,128</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel size (w × w)</td>
<td>(2,2),(3,3)</td>
<td>(2,2)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel height (h)</td>
<td>2,4,8,16,32,64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max kernel height (h_{max})</td>
<td>40:10:80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool size (p)</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batch size</td>
<td>128, 256</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activations</td>
<td>Relu, Sigmoid, Tanh</td>
<td>Sigmoid</td>
<td>Tanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout</td>
<td>U(0.1, 0.3)</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning rate</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. CNN layers (L)</td>
<td>1:1:4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Tuned hyperparameters of the RF models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>RF on raw fields</th>
<th>RF on Quantiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Num. estimators</td>
<td>20:20:100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max depth</td>
<td>4:4:20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min samples leaf</td>
<td>2:10:102</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min samples split</td>
<td>U(2, 10)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrap</td>
<td>True, False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion</td>
<td>Gini, Entropy</td>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>Gini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To compare the performance of the different models, we rely on standard machine learning
metrics such as precision, recall, F-measure and AUC-ROC for the IoT class. Precision is the
ratio of correctly classified IoT devices over all the instances that have been designated as IoT using
the proposed model (precision = \frac{tp}{tp+fp}). Recall is the ratio of correctly classified IoT devices
over the total number that is actually existing within the test data (recall = \frac{tp}{tp+fn}). Recall demonstrates
the model’s ability to find all relevant cases within a given dataset, whereas precision gives
the model’s ability to designate only the actual relevant cases as relevant. In order to bring these
two metrics together, often F-measure is employed which takes the weighted average of precision

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and recall, i.e., the harmonic mean ($F$-measure = \( \frac{2 \cdot \text{precision} \cdot \text{recall}}{\text{precision} + \text{recall}} \)). The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC-ROC) is a threshold-independent performance measurement for classification. It measures the entire two-dimensional area underneath the ROC curve (i.e., true positive rate vs false positive rate at all classification thresholds) from (0,0) to (1,1).

We report the results in Figures 4 and 5. We can note that the AUC-ROC score for the RF model trained on quantiles is slightly higher than that of the other models. Further, both of the figures reveal that the CNN-based models result in higher recall and lower precision scores in contrast to the RF models. The outcome also shows that the multi-window 1D-CNN (MW-1D-CNN) outperforms the 1D-CNN and the 2D-CNN; this is quite expected, since packet fields (unlike image pixels) lack temporal or spatial relationships with one another. Therefore, moving the kernels over the horizontal dimension would not lead to better learning. Furthermore, the multi-window 1D-CNN can capture varying dynamics given that only a portion of the scan packets actually hit the /8 darknet.

![Figure 4: Performance metrics of the devised models](image)

![Figure 5: AUC-ROC curves to evaluate the devised models](image)
4.3.1. Feature importance

To shed light on which features were most decisive in the learning process, and given that the RF models performed the highest, we illustrate the features’ scores (derived from the RF model on quantiles) in Figure 6. As expected, the distribution of destination ports which typically reveals the scans’ intentions plays the most noteworthy role for fingerprinting IoT devices. This is closely followed by other fields such as the total packet length and the total header length, in addition to the TCP/IP stack and OS-related fields including the TCP window size, option fields and the TTL.

![Figure 6: Ranking of features’ importance](image)

4.3.2. Effect of number of packets ($t$) on the classifiers

Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the impact of the number of packets within the input sample $X \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times d}$ on the AUC-ROC and processing time (loading and training data). To quantify the effect for each value of $t$, we execute the training process 10 times using parameters taken from the best models, retrieved from Tables 3 and 4. Although it is expected that increasing the number of packets will increase the total amount of information to be processed, subsequently increasing a model’s performance, it is not consistently proven. Reviewing the results in Figure 7, when a RF model is trained using raw features, adding an increasing amount of packet data will eventually confuse the model, lowering the AUC-ROC of the RF model. In contrast, when a RF model is trained on quantiles, increasing the amount of input packet data actually lead to an improvement in the AUC-ROC of the model, with diminishing returns. In addition, it can be seen that changing $t$ has no significant trending effect on the AUC-ROC of CNN-based models.

Figure 8 reveals that an increased sample size, containing a larger number of packets, will generally increase the processing time. Most evidently perceived in the MW-ID-CNN model, its high complexity leads to a significant increase in processing time as the sample size is increased. However, an increased sample size leads to a slight decrease in processing time for a quantile-trained RF model. Ultimately, the results depict that maximum AUC is achieved through training an RF model with $t = 90$. Furthermore, the non-RF models have an acceptable performance and AUC value at $t = 90$. Therefore, to facilitate future implementations and experimentation, $t = 90$ is found to be a suitable choice for efficient and accurate classification.

4.4. Inferring and characterizing compromised IoT devices and campaigns

Given the aforementioned classification results, we selected the MW-ID-CNN model since it provided the highest true positive rate while limiting the false positive rate to around 0.08
By applying the binary classifier on 24 hours of darknet data of December 13th, it was capable of fingerprinting 441,766 out of the 1,787,718 unique scanners to be originating from compromised IoT devices. Although previous works solely considered those with a Mirai signature as IoT-related [5], we inferred that in fact, they make up less than 25% of the IoT scanner population that the proposed model was able to uncover, leaving a whopping 75% to go about their malicious activities without any semblance of an adequate attribution.

Table 5 summarizes the location of these exploited devices, where Brazil (41.93%) was found to be hosting a significant portion, followed by Iran (10.17%), China (5.14%), Russia (3.59%), Egypt (3.36%), India (2.47%) and Turkey (2.32%).

Furthermore, the top three ISPs hosting the largest number of compromised IoT devices were Vivo (134,021), TE Data (11,804) and Iran Telecom Co. (9,912).

While the extensive presence of IoT scanners alone gives pause for concern, a relatively significant proportion residing within the telecommunication and ISP sectors is rather expected; conversely, their existence within sectors including but not limited to critical sectors is quite alarming. In Table 6, critical sectors which appear in lists provided by the U.S. Department
Table 5: Top countries hosting infected IoT devices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>41.93</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>Korea (south)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst the inferred instances, quite a few were found to be located within that of medical infrastructures (87), government entities (86), manufacturing realms (99), and commercial businesses (38).

Table 6: Top Sectors hosting infected IoT devices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>175,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Service Provider</td>
<td>82,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Service</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Hosting Services</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Colocation Services</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Services</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodging</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Service</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along those lines, the lengthy list of 50 identified vendors reveals a broad range of manufactures and device types that IoT botnets demonstrate preference for exploitation. Amongst them, MikroTik (14,090), Aposonic (2,222), Huawei (732), Foscam (594) and Hikvision (417) are the topmost five targeted by the tagged compromised devices. Routers (53.64%) and IP Camera/DVR (28.93%) continue to be the most frequently infected devices.
Moreover, the most commonly targeted ports based upon the number of scanning packets generated by the compromised IoT devices are reported in Table 7. The top targeted ports include 23 (41.9%), 80 (23.9%), 8080 (19.7%), 5555 (4.9%), 81 (3.2%), 2323 (1.7%) and 22 (1.3%). Intriguingly, we identified the presence of non-IoT targeted ports such as 2480 (OrientDB), 5984 (CouchDB), 3389 (RDP), 7001 (Oracle), 5900 (VNC) and 2004 (Drupal), as well as that of uncommonly used IoT ports 32764 (router backdoor), 37215 (UPnP in SOHO routers) and 52869 (UPnP in wireless chipsets). Set \{23, 80, 8080\} is the most prevalent target port combination; 54% of devices actually only scan this port combination.

Table 7: TCP port distribution determined by quantifying the number of compromised IoT scan packets received by each included port. Grey cells highlight unconventional, rarely probed ports and services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Telnet</td>
<td>41.91</td>
<td>8181</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>23.917</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>HTTPS</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8080</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>19.784</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>FTP</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>3389</td>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5555</td>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>4.995</td>
<td>7547</td>
<td>TR-064</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>8090</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>3.288</td>
<td>8081</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>8089</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2323</td>
<td>Telnet-alt</td>
<td>1.705</td>
<td>8888</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>SMB</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>SSH</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>37215</td>
<td>UPnP</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>7001</td>
<td>WebLogic</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9000</td>
<td>MCTP</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>2480</td>
<td>OrientDB</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>52869</td>
<td>UPnP</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>445</td>
<td>SMB</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>5984</td>
<td>CouchDB</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>8291</td>
<td>Winbox</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5358</td>
<td>Telnet</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>MS-SQL</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>8001</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>5900</td>
<td>VNC</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2222</td>
<td>SSH</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>8088</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Drupal</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8443</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>UPnP</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32764</td>
<td>Linksys Vuln.</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>HTTP-alt</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inferring and reporting on orchestrated IoT botnets. Among the 441,766 IoT scanners that were detected on Dec. 13th, 2018, based on the results in Section 3.4, those that sent less than 500 packets were filtered out to exclude any of those that can degrade the estimation of the probability distribution function $\pi$. Subsequently, the respective features were extracted and the clustering method described in Section 3.4 was executed. In roughly 40,000 scan flows, we witnessed less than 0.01% of packets in each scan flow arriving at specific UDP ports (e.g., 5998, 43922, 48715, 31869 etc.). After analyzing such occurrences, we deduced they resulted from associated bugs or attacks on P2P networks such as BitTorrent; an observation that is also consistent with previous works [76]. As a result, in order to avoid the ill-effects of uncorrelated incidents, the identified packets were removed prior to clustering. Regarding the inferred campaigns, the proposed approach detected over 350 orchestrated IoT botnets. Since the size of each IoT probing campaign translates to its given severity, we summarize those botnets possessing more than 300 coordinated IoT bots in Table 8. Interestingly, in solely considering IoT scanners that targeted the set of ports \{23, 80, 8080\}, we detected 30 distinct botnets with differing distributions, Flag (i.e., Mirai-like signature/behavior), and ARR.
Table 8: Orchestrated IoT botnets in the wild

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Id</th>
<th>Ports</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>ARR</th>
<th>#Bots</th>
<th>Crypto Miners</th>
<th>Compromised Devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139,858</td>
<td>[0.33 0.33 0.34]</td>
<td>MikroTik, Hikvision, Foscam, Vivoteck, Huawei, Aposonic, Intelbras, Ubiquiti, Netgear, Mitratstar, Askey, Archer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55,139</td>
<td>[0.294 0.295 0.411]</td>
<td>MikroTik, Hikvision, Intelbras, TP-LINK, D-Link, Huawei, ZTE, Foscam, QNAP, ZyXEL, Cisco, SERCOMM, Vivoteck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>23, 2323</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36,464</td>
<td>[0.9 0.1]</td>
<td>Huawei, Aposonic, Foscam, Hikvision, MikroTik, Cisco, TP-LINK, CIG Shanghai, ZTE, Ubiquiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,895</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>Huawei, Hikvision, MikroTik, AvTech, ZTE, Foscam, Cisco, Ubiquiti, NUUO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5555</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,050</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>Huawei, TP-Link, Hikvision, Aposonic, Foscam , MikroTik, Sagemcom, iGate, VNPT, Trendchip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23, 81</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9,805</td>
<td>[0.495 0.505]</td>
<td>Aposonic, Foscam, Huawei, Hikvision, ZTE, Lilin, Sagemcom, Netgear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,610</td>
<td>[0.171 0.650 0.179]</td>
<td>MikroTik, TP-LINK, Hikvision, AvTech, Foscam, D-Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>Huawei, Hikvision, TP-Link, AvTech, TP-LINK, Aposonic, ZEM800, ZTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,971</td>
<td>[0.242 0.244 0.514]</td>
<td>MikroTik, ZTE, Hikvision, TP-LINK, Foscam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>DZS, Foscam, MikroTik, Synology, ZyXEL, Hikvision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>[0.492 0.508]</td>
<td>MikroTik, Foscam, Hikvision, Huawei, TP-LINK, Ubiquiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,689</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>D-LINK, Hikvision, Aposonic, MikroTik, Broadcom, ASUS, AVM, Netgear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,468</td>
<td>[0.442 0.032 0.526]</td>
<td>MikroTik, TP-LINK, Hikvision, D-Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,911</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>GPON (DZS), Hikvision, Huawei, MikroTik, Dasan, Foscam, Mercuysys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>22, 2222</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>[0.897 0.103]</td>
<td>QNAP, Huawei, Hikvision, ASUS, Foscam, SERCOMM, MikroTik, Intelbras, Ubiquiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>23, 2323, 5555</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>[0.249 0.032 0.719]</td>
<td>ZyXEL, MikroTik, Avtech, Broadcom, Foscam, TP-LINK, Hikvision, D-Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>23, 2323</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>[0.967 0.033]</td>
<td>Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, MikroTik, Aposonic, ZEM800, Foscam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>[1.]</td>
<td>TP-LINK, Hikvision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>23, 32764, 80, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8089, 8090, 81, 8181, 8443, 8888, 9000</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>[0.034 0.122 0.153 0.02 0.154 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.068 0.123 0.122 0.022 0.121]</td>
<td>NUUO, Foscam, Hikvision, Huawei, AVM, MikroTik, Aposonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>23, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>[0.48 0.52]</td>
<td>MikroTik, Hikvision, D-Link, TP-LINK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>23, 80, 8080</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>[0.384 0.319 0.298]</td>
<td>MikroTik, SERCOMM, Foscam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>80, 8080+rand</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>[0.45 0.45]</td>
<td>MikroTik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Packet inter-arrival time analysis generated from the inferred botnets. Following the investigation of scan-based behaviors of the inferred compromised IoT devices, we deduced two separate classes of unique scan traits. Class 1 includes devices that present periodic behavior in the time series of their packet Inter-Arrival Time (IAT). For rate limiting purposes [77], such devices seem to generate a fixed number of packets then wait exactly 1 second to re-confirm their desired scanning rate (in packets per second (pps)). This leads to high peaks in their histograms of packet IATs as seen in Figure 9a. In contrast, the members of the Class 2 do not portray any related periodic behavior when analyzing their packet IAT. Figure 9b portrays the IAT of the packets generated by the IoT devices of Class 2, demonstrating an exponential distribution. To detect the aforementioned behaviors, we first calculate the histogram of packet IATs and then identify the peaks with an auto-correlation coefficient (Figures 9c and 9d). To reveal the population of such inferred classes in the context of the identified probing campaigns, Figure 10 illustrates the fraction of scanning classes in each campaign.

Scan rate analysis of the inferred IoT botnets. Figure 11 presents the distribution of scanning rates extracted from the inferred IoT botnets, as perceived by the network telescope. Campaigns in which their scan rates follow a normal distribution with a single peak and a narrow width (such as #1, #2, #6, #11, #14, #15, #18 and #20 of Table 8) were found to be exhibiting strong rate limiting policies regardless of their identified scanning class. In contrast, the rates of botnets #3, #8 and #17 are distributed over a wider range, showing no artificial rate limiting behaviors. In fact, this inference matches the released source code of the Mirai malware (which botnet
Figure 9: Sample of packet IAT’s histograms for Class 1 (a) and Class 2 (b) scanning practices. (c) and (d) respectively show the auto-correlation of (a) and (b) and the detected peaks.

Figure 10: Fraction of the derived scanning practices within the top populated campaigns (as detailed in Table 8).
is attributed to), demonstrating the lack of rate limiting practices. For classes that were discovered to have no artificial rate limiting usages, each individually-compromised device sent a maximized number of scan packets based on their processing power and throughput. By focusing on the scanning rates’ distributions of the inferred campaigns coupled with their population of scanning classes (Figure 10), we can deduce some facts about the purity of the clustered campaigns. This enable further scrutiny of such campaigns to determine if they contain a singular or multiple botnets. Note that IAT-related features were not included during the clustering mechanism of Section 3.4. With this in mind, we further examined the identified campaigns looking for Class 1 scan traits (those employing rate limiting practices) while their rates’ distributions showing negative outcomes related to following a single normal distribution. The outcome, for instance, showed that although botnet #5 was identified as possessing Class 1 scan traits, its distribution of scanning rate shows 3 distinct peaks. Therefore, we postulate that there may be three unique botnets that were misidentified within a single cluster. Nevertheless, this is expected for campaigns with a single target port (and eventually $\pi = [1]$), similar to campaign #5.

Figure 11: A Violin illustration of the top 20 populated campaigns’ scanning rated as observed on the /8 network telescope

Geo-distributions of the inferred IoT botnets. By examining the geo-distribution characteristics of the identified botnets, we observe significant differences. Figure 12 depicts the geo-distribution of the most populated campaigns generating scan events from multiple continents. Indeed, geo-distribution characteristics are likely a direct result of the popularity differences related to the adopted device types and manufacturers, which is known to be unique to each region [31]. Since botnets leverage definitive attack vectors, they are typically customized to target specific vendors; coherently, the vendor’s popularity will also attract botnets, which is reflected in the concentration of such popular devices/bots in certain geo-locations. For further analysis, Figure 13 displays the cumulative distribution of campaigns over Autonomous Systems (AS). Despite a few cases with highly similar distributions (e.g., #2 and #9), other specially less populated botnets are discovered to have a larger difference between distributions, as shown in Figure 13b. Furthermore, amidst the inferred campaigns, there exists campaigns whose geo-distributions do not comply with that of the global distribution of infections (Table 5). For instance, with respect to campaigns #7, #13, #24 and #27, over 98% of infected IoT devices are located in a single region.
devices are located in Iran. Campaign #30 has upwards of 50% and 10% of compromised IoT devices located in USA and UK, respectively. Further, campaign #28 shows a 40% infection rate in North America, and a 21% infection rate in Europe. Spread across multiple geographic regions, these campaigns contradict the global distribution of infections.

Figure 12: Geo-distribution of the top 20 populated campaigns over different continents

Figure 13: Cumulative distribution of the top 20 populated campaigns (of Table 8) over different Autonomous Systems

**IoT botnets with cryptojacking capability.** Aside from the dominant monetization method for IoT botnets performing DDoS attacks, cryptojacking has emerged as a critical IoT botnet capability [78, 79]. In essence, compromised routers have become responsible for injecting JavaScript crypto-currency miners into the HTTP pages requested by devices on their network [80]. JavaScript miners such as Coinhive [81] and xmrMiner [82] strive for Monero altcoin in particular. To this end, we examined the responses to HTTP requests derived from the IoT scanners, tagging those that contain the xmrMiner or Coinhive JavaScript modules, and exporting
their corresponding keys. By doing so, we discovered 1,134 xmrMiner and 923 Coinhive instances with 23 and 30 distinct keys, respectively. The campaigns designated as containing members with cryptojacking capabilities are highlighted in Table 8. The relation of crypto-mining keys appearing in each campaign is illustrated using a 3-partite graph as in Figure 14. We analyzed the graph to find the number of components to uncover any further relations between the campaigns. Interestingly, the graph is connected. This demonstrates that salient connections exist between all the campaigns involved in cryptojacking activities.

In addition, we uncovered large campaigns maintaining crypto-miner instances with and without the presence of Mirai-like signatures. Moreover, 943 out of 1,134 devices, belonging to a total of 18 campaigns (#1, #2, #4, #7, #8, #11, #13, #15, #16, #19, #20, #21, #24, #32, #33, #35 and #36), share the same xmrMiner-related key “4983e34ef01b4b579725b3a228e59e79” (red edges in Figure 14). In other words, large portions of significant IoT campaigns could be reported to be attributed to the same “player”. Additionally, upon exploring the key within Censys, 54,743 Mikrotiks were shown to possess it. In total, these campaigns equate to approximately 250,000 compromised IoT devices, or 54% of all the identified compromised devices.

Figure 14: A 3-partite graph of discovered cryptomining-related keys within each campaign. Each key is represented by its first 5 characters. Red threads highlight the reuse of the same key "4983e34ef01b4b579725b3a228e59e79" in 18 different campaigns.

A closer look at other campaigns of interest. Campaign #3 with 36,464 bots was inferred to be targeting ports 23 and 2323 with a proportion of 9:1, which is the same as instructed within the Mirai released code. Another interesting observation pertains to botnet #26 (of Table 8) where packets to random TCP and UDP ports were sent in addition to targeting the defined set of ports of {23, 2480, 5555, 5984, 80, 8080}. Additionally, this campaign targeted port 2480 (OrientDB) and 5984 (CouchDB), as well as other common IoT-related ports including 23, 5555 (ADB) and
Upon further analysis, this behavior could be attributable to the infamous Hide and Seek botnet [83].

For port 32764 which is related to a backdoor vulnerability [84], the proposed IoT botnet clustering approach revealed a campaign of substantial size (#19 in Table 8), consisting of 2,140 active IoT scanners with the signature of \(<\{23, 32764, 80, 8000, 8080, 8089, 8090, 81, 8181, 8443, 8888, 9000\}, \text{Flag} = 1, \text{ARR} = 1\>\). We did not come across any previously reported botnet families that scan such ports. As a result, we postulated that this campaign is either new or specific ports have been recently added to the target list of a previously known IoT botnet. Another aspect is that this is the only large campaign that exploited a relatively significant number of NUUO products, which is a common indicator of the Reaper IoT botnet. The JenX botnet [85], which scans ports 37215 and 52869, was also disclosed. Moreover, a botnet with \(<\{2004, 80, 8080, 81\}, \text{Flag} = 0, \text{ARR} = 2\>\) was also discovered and consisted of 35 coordinated IoT scanners, all of which compromised QNAP NAS. This campaign strongly resembles the Mahostik botnet [86], with the exception of the substitution of port 7001 with 81 in the target port set.

With the prevalence of IoT botnets, port 5555 (Android debug bridge) has become a popular target port. We found 23 IoT botnets that include port 5555 as part of their target set. Based on the reports on ADB miner [87] and the similarity of its scanning module to Mirai, we can attribute the inferred large IoT botnet (#5 in Table 8) to Mirai or its variant Fbot [88]. Additionally, we found xmrMiner instances with the same previously noted key (of Figure 14 in the latter campaign and in campaign #16. Based off the set of target ports pertaining to campaign #25 (port 23, 5358), it seems to be highly likely attributed to that of the Hajime [21] [89] IoT botnet. In total, this campaign possessed 1,059 active IoT scanners (made up of IP cameras/DVRs).

A note on Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We also inferred an IoT botnet of 25 bots with the signature \(<\{102, 8888, 993\}, \text{Flag} = 0, \text{ARR} = 1\>\), probing Siemens S7 (heavily used in SCADA systems), IEC 61850 and ICCP (both are mostly used in utility/electric substations) on port 102. To provide additional insights, we also actively scanned each of the identified compromised IoT devices for ICS open ports on TCP and UDP 102 (S7), 502 (MODBUS), 20000 (DNP3), 47808 (BACNET) and 1911 (FOX) [90, 91] and found 100, 101, 465, 70 and 85 devices with open ports, respectively. We note that we have also inferred close to 40 devices having simultaneously all the above-mentioned ICS ports open, which we thought are related to ICS honeypots. Nevertheless, the appearance of compromised IoT devices within ICS setups is alarming.

5. Concluding Remarks

With the continuous adoption of the IoT paradigm in critical infrastructure and consumer sectors, their security and privacy concerns are becoming quite serious, leading to devastating consequences. This work compliments current IoT-centric research by offering a macroscopic, generic and passive methodology to infer Internet-scale compromised IoT devices and to report on ongoing IoT botnets. The work initially introduces a novel darknet-specific sanitization model that contributes to the field of Internet measurements at large. Subsequently, by devising a binary classifier based upon a CNN in conjunction with active measurements, the proposed work is capable of fingerprinting compromised IoT devices by solely operating on darknet traffic. Consequently, by automating the generation of signatures related to the ports being probed coupled with their distribution in addition to other simplistic yet effective features, the proposed approach provides the capability to infer ongoing orchestrated botnets. The results demonstrate
the significant security issue with the IoT paradigm by exposing more than 400,000 exploited IoT devices during only a 24-hour period, some of which have been deployed in critical sectors such as medical and manufacturing. Additionally, the outcome provides evidence-based indicators related to ongoing IoT botnets such as those of Mirai, Hide and Seek, and Reaper, to name a few. More interestingly, the results demonstrate evolving IoT botnets with cryptojacking capabilities, where many of those seem to be attributed to the same mastermind by exposing the same employed key.

Future work will address current limitations. This includes addressing the misidentification of two distinct IoT botnets (as one larger campaign) by including packet IAT related features, and improving the tagging/labeling procedure. We will also examine IoT-specific malware samples and devising formal methodologies between the traffic they generate from one side and the corresponding darknet traffic from the other side, to fortify the attribution evidence. Moreover, extracting a number of features from IoT malware binaries will empower the attribution of each malware sample to their respective campaigns, enabling agile IoT botnet inference and characterization for mitigation and remediation purposes.

Acknowledgments

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